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THE LAW AND THE SURVIVING SPOUSE:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY
RICHARD W. POWER
Successful combination of freedom of testation and inter vivos dis-
postiion of property, on one hand, with recognition of the claims of the
decedent's immediate family, on the other, is a challenging goal for the
legislator. Solutions in Western countries, while tending to avoid ex-
tremes of flexibility and rigidity in permissible dispositions, present strik-
ing differences in their various techniques of compromisng these compet-
ing interests. Foreign solutions to this problem may be a source for
shaping the revision of the presently unsatisfactory solution of the Amer-
ican law. This paper, after preliminary discussion of the present defects
of the American law and the general approach of the French law, will ex-
plore the present treatment of the surviving spouse under French law
and the revisions in that regard that have recently been proposed by the
Commission for the Revision of the Civil Code.
I. UNDERLYING ATTITUDES AS FACTORS SHAPING THE SYSTEMS
OF SUCCESSION
The idea of transmission of accumulated property through blood
lines is one that has been accepted throughout the Western world. In
the common law countries, though not imposed by law, it is accorded
wide popular acceptance in practice and is reflected in the rules of in-
testate succession; in other parts of the Western world transmission
through blood lines is to a large extent compelled by the laws of succession.
Systems of succession typically make some provision for the surviv-
ing spouse. Legislators have been and continue to be faced with the
question of whether the survivor should be assured of nothing, of a
right to support, or of a substantial share of the predeceasing spouse's
property. That question naturally raises the companion inquiry of how
the surviving spouse's rights should be integrated with those of the chil-
dren. Should it be possible to give him everything to the exclusion of the
children? Although fitting the surviving spouse into the pattern of the
system of successions has been one of the most troublesome problems of
legislators, in both civil and common law systems his claim has been recog-
nized to an increasingly greater extent. On one hand, in the Western
tradition of marriage, the surviving spouse's claim is very strong be-
cause of the unique relationship reflected in the common law by the
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notion of identity of the spouses. Furthermore, the surviving spouse
often is in need of or may at some future time be in need of funds
for living expenses. Yet there is an awareness, perhaps even an appre-
hension, that property transmitted to the surviving spouse may soon find
its way to a subsequent spouse upon remarriage or to the surviving
spouse's relatives who are not related to the decedent spouse either by
blood or affection. This consideration may in part account for the tradi-
tionally ungenerous treatment of the surviving spouse in regard to his
indefeasible rights in both French law and the common law. Moreover,
the common-law's device, dower, is also compatible with the perpetuation
of economic power within a small group by such means as primogeniture.
Such scholars as Rheinstein,1 Laube,2 Cahn3 and Macdonald4 have
questioned the present limits of freedom of testation in the United States.
The principal American limitation is the statutory indefeasible share of
the surviving spouse in separate property states (in some states only a
widow), which permits the spouse to renounce his benefits, if any, under
the will and to claim a share of the estate, typically the intestate share of
one-third or one-half.' Despite such provision for surviving spouses, it
may be urged that they have inadequate protection against disinheritance
because of the possibility of defeasance of their rights by inter vivos gifts.
Though the law varies widely even among seperate property states as to
the type of inter vivos transaction which will be upheld as against the
surviving spouse, it is everywhere open to serious criticism.6 Even in
states where some substantial protection from inter vivos transfers exist,
t Associate Professor of Law, Saint Louis University.
1. RHEiNSTEmN, THE LAW OF DECEDENTS' ESTATES ch. 5 (2d ed. 1955) ; Rheinstein,
Book Review, 59 MICH. L. Ray. 806 (1961).
2. Laube, Right of a Testator to Pauperize his Helpless Dependents, 13 CORNELL
L. Q. 559 (1928).
3. Cahn, Restraints ot Disinheritace, 85 U. PA. L. Rav. 139 (1937).
4. MACDONALD, FRAUD ON THE WIDOw'S SHARE (1960).
5. See generally Phipps, Marital Property Interests, 27 Rocxy MT. L. REv. 180
(1955).
6. See generally MACDONALD, op. cit. supra, note 4, at 67-180. A helpful summary
is contained in TURRENTINE, CASES AND TExT ON WILLS AND ADMINISTRATi-ON 27-32
(2d ed. 1962). Some courts look only to see if the predeceasing spouse had divested
himself of legal title to property before his death; if so, the surviving spouse's interest
has been defeated. Other courts look to see whether the transfer was "real" or "illus-
ory;" still others have emphasized retention of control, holding that mere revocability
of the prior transfer will subject assets to the wife's claim. Some cases have stressed
the motive for the transfer, holding that a transfer can be upset by the surviving spouse
if it is in fraud of his marital rights, a phrase that has proved to be so devoid of
meaning as to be unsatisfactory. Nevertheless this latter test is the one adopted by the
MODEL PROBATE CODE § 33(a) (Simes 1946). See also SIMES, PUBLIC POLICY AND THE
DEAD HAND 1-31 (1955), suggesting that the techniques of the federal estate tax laws
for including some inter vivos transfers in the estate for estate tax purposes could be
utilized in working out statutory protections for the surviving spouse.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
the law thereby may have been made uncertain and therefore unsatisfac-
tory. The more realistic systems of the nine community property states
accord a surviving spouse much greater protection because community
property rights cannot generally be defeated either by the will of the pre-
deceasing spouse or by a purported inter vivos gift.' Though statutes of
separate property states accord the surviving spouse substantial protec-
tion from disinheritance by will through the indefeasible share, in vir-
tually any separate property state a predeceasing spouse may make an ab-
solute inter vivos transfer of property which will render worthless the
surviving spouse's claim to an indefeasible share.8 Practically, the more
significant problems of protection from defeasance arise not in absolute
inter vivos transfers but in transactions wherein the transferor retains
some interest or control over the property. One might well ask why,
unless for some reason it is infeasible or unwanted, the American spouse
in non-community property states does not enjoy effective protection
from inter vivos transfers.
As to the child in the United States, protection from disinheritance
by will is scant. At most the parent need but mention in the will that he
intends to disinherit the child.9 There is, however, some additional de
facto protection afforded by judges and juries who "correct" the law by
a fictional finding of lack of testamentary capacity or undue influence in
order to upset a will which disinherits children in favor of persons other
than a surviving spouse, but existence of this kind of protection seems to
support an argument in favor of change rather than maintenance of the
status quo. There is no protection against inter vivos transfers, except
possibly for a similar sort of de facto protection by judicial avoidance of
the gift transaction. Regardless of the age or status of dependency of the
child, only one or two states make any gesture toward curbing the power
of a parent determined to disinherit him in favor of any person.1" Many
states' statutes nonetheless indicate some awareness of the problem while
stopping far short of effective protection. Examples of this are preter-
mitted heir statutes, after-born heir statutes, and favored inheritance tax
treatment of lineal descendants. Nonetheless, it is clear that legislatures
have not demonstrated the same intention to protect the child that they
show in the case of the spouse by the indefeasible share. Thus, a basic
shift in legislative attitude must occur before the question of the quantum
and method of protection of the child from disinheritance by will or inter
7. 2 AmERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 7.22 (Casner ed. 1952).
8. See note 6 szpra.
9. ATxiNSON, WILLS 141 (2d ed. 1953).
10. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. A-NN. § 733.20 (1963) ;NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-103 (1943).
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vivos gift will arise in this country. However, the presently increasing
incidence of marriages to which are brought children of a previous mar-
riage makes more urgent a reconsideration of and revised solution to the
problem of equitable treatment of the surviving spouse and all of the
children of the deceased.1
Professor Dunham's recent investigation of wills in Chicago in-
dicates the need for working out the rights of the surviving spouse
and children together. 2 In twenty-seven of twenty-eight wills examined
in which testators were survived by spouses, everything was given to the
spouse;" when the testator was survived by spouse and children, all
twenty-two wills examined resulted in disinheritance of the children, 4
though not a permanent disinheritance. The significant, and not merely
technical, disinheritance occurs if at all on the death of the survivor of
the spouses.' In sixty-nine per cent of the wills of testators survived by
children but not spouses, the children were given unequal amounts, but
no child was excluded entirely, except in two wills in which provision was
made instead for grandchildren. However, the findings of Cohen, Rob-
son and Bates"0 are noted to the effect that "there is a rather strong feel-
ing that parents should not be permitted to disinherit their children.""7
Professor Dunham concludes that intestacy laws in Illinois pro-
viding for "the present statutory share of one-third of the estate for
the surviving spouse, if there are children, is almost completely con-
trary to the expectations of the average testator."'" He recognizes, how-
ever, that the law may not be constructed entirely by reference to the
expectations and wishes of the average person. The lawmaker must also
be concerned with the occasional "bad" man who deviates shockingly
from the community's pattern. Thus, even if the premise that the in-
testacy laws should mirror the average person's disposition of property
is generally accepted as sound, it is not an inescapable conclusion that the
surviving spouse should take all in intestacy because in the sampling an
overwhelming percentage of predeceasing spouses' wills left all to the
survivor. The legislature may also properly be concerned with limiting
the freedom of the survivor of the spouses in disposing of the property,
11. MACDONALD, op. cit. sapra note 4, at 10-15.
12. Dunham, The Method, Process and Frequency of Wealth Transmission at
Death, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 241 (1963).
13. Id. at 253.
14. Id. at 252.
15. Id. at 256.
16. COHEN, RoBsoN & BATES, PARENTAL AUTHORITY: THE COMMUNITY AND THE
LAW 76 (1958).
17. Dunham, supra note 12, at 256.
18. Id. at 258.
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for example, by giving the surviving spouse only a life interest in all of
the property of the intestate predeceasing spouse. Perhaps the survivor
should not be permitted to upset completely the expectation of the pre-
deceasing spouse that the property will pass to the children upon the
death of the survivor. Moreover, the size of the estate may be a
consideration in determining how much should pass to the spouse, as
recent English legislation has recognized.19
The Chicago study permits no definite conclusion as to the dimen-
sion of the problem of wrongful disinheritance of spouses and children.20
No cases of shockingly inequitable treatment occurred in the limited
sampling, but that is not to say that no problem exists. The policy ques-
tion can be stated in terms of usually unneeded and occasionally undesir-
able restraints on one side to be balanced against vital safeguards in the
unusual case of shocking deviation. A spouse's or child's feeling of se-
curity in knowing that he cannot be excluded from sharing in the prop-
erty of his spouse or parent is arguably a significant purpose to be
achieved by the rules of succession.
In his monumental study of the American law, Fraud on the
Widow's Share, Professor Macdonald concludes that protection accorded
the widow by a statutory indefeasible share of the deceased husband's
estate is insufficient because it does not prevent evasive depletion of the
estate by inter vivos gifts.2 ' Accordingly, he proposes elimination of the
indefeasible share and the creation of a right of spouses and dependent
children to a maintenance allowance in case of need from the estate of the
deceased spouse, or, if insufficient, from inter vivos gifts made by him.
This proposal follows in many respects the pattern of recent legislation in
England2 and much of the British Commonwealth; such legislation,
however, fails to make provision for protecting the survivors from inter
vivos gifts. While Professor Macdonald has demonstrated the in-
adequacy of the existing American system, and while his proposals
protect the deceased's family from want, they may be criticized for
19. The Administration of Estates Act of 1925, as amended by the Intestate's
Act of 1952, provides that the surviving spouse takes the first f5000 of the deceased
spouse's estate when issue survive, and the first £20,000 when a parent or issue of
parents survive. As to the excess, the surviving spouse takes a life interest in one-half.
The Administration of Estates Act, 1925, 15 Geo. 5, c. 31, as amended, Intestate's Act,
1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 64.
20. Dunham, supra note 12, at 262.
21. MACDONAI.D, op. cit. supra note 4.
22. English Inheritance (Family Provision) Act, 1938, 1 & 2 Geo. 6, c. 45. See
discussion in MACDONALD, Op. cit. supra note 4, at 290-98 and materials cited therein at
291 n.3.
23. See, e.g., The Family Protection Act, 1900, 64 Vict. c. 20, as amended, 1947,
11 Geo. 6, c. 60, § 15 (N.Z.).
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denying the family any other indefeasible rights in the deceased's
property. The framers of the Continental codes, recognizing the need
of integration of lifetime and at-death disposition of property, as does
Macdonald, have at the same time established forced shares for reserve
heirs-lineal relatives and in some countries the spouse. Thus, under
Continental systems the family's interest in the deceased's property is far
more secure than in the United States, and far more extensive than that
which Macdonald would accord.
French law, the model of other Continental systems, offers much
less opportunity for defeasance of family interests than does the Ameri-
can law. In France, as in American community property states, the
spouse is typically protected by indefeasible rights in community property.
More favored than the French spouse is the French child, who is pro-
tected from disinheritance by will and is also given effective protection
against disinheritance by inter vivos transfers. The reserve share of
the lineal descendants of the decedent or, in their absence, his parents or
closest surviving lineal ancestor is the salient feature of the French sys-
tem of successions, constituting a substantial modification of the rights
of ownership in the Anglo-American conception. The extent of the
restrictions imposed by the system of reserve portions depends upon the
number and kind (ancestors or descendants) of reserve heirs which sur-
vive. If, for example, one parent but no children survives the deceased,
the freely disposable portion of the deceased's property is three-fourths,
making the parent's reserve share one-fourth.24 When children or
other descendants survive, they displace parents as reserve heirs. Thus,
should three children survive, the freely disposable portion is one-fourth,
three-fourths of the property being the children's reserve portion.25 The
object of the reserve is to protect the closest blood relatives of the de-
ceased from dispositions by gift or will which he could otherwise have
made to their detriment." Significantly, inter vivos gifts and disposi-
24. CODE CIVIL art. 914 (Fr. 63d ed. Dalloz 1964) (hereinafter cited as CODE
CIVIL).
25. CODE CIvIL art. 913. This reserve portion may occasionally be modified by reason
of the spouse's special portion. CODE CIVIL art. 1094.
26. For a general summary of the French law of testate and intestate successions,
see Amos & WALTON, INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAw 288-338 (2d ed. 1963). As to the
nature, background and criticisms of the reserve see BoiSSONADE, HISTORE DE LARt-
SERVE HL-RtDITAIRE (1873); 3 PLANIOL, TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LAw pt. 2, §§
3047-57 (11th ed. 1959) ; Charmont, The System of Compulsary Partition of
Estates, in RATIONAL BASIS OF LEGAL INSTITuTIONS 430 (Wigmore & Kocourek ed.
1923) ; 4 RIPERT & BOULANGER, TRAITA DE DROIT CIVIL §§ 1819-60 (1959); WEDGEWOOD,
THE EcoNomics OF INHERITANCE 67-81 (1929). Reserve heirs have traditionally had a
right to their shares of the succession in kind, subject to the deceased's power to select
the property he wishes to pass to others as the freely disposable share. One reserve
heir can be favored over another to the extent of the free share. Ibid.
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tions by will are integrated in making a determination of the quantum of
the indefeasible rights of reserve heirs. To the extent that dispositions
by gift or will exceed the freely disposable portion, they are subject to
an action in reduction by reserve heirs whose shares have been impaired.
Legacies are first reduced pro rata, and if the reserve is still impaired,
inter vivos gifts may be recovered in inverse chronological order.2" Ob-
viously, the reserve operates simultaneously to put a limit upon the amount
of property that can be transferred to those, such as a surviving spouse,
who are not reserve heirs under the present system. It is immediately
apparent that the system of reserve portions to a large extent fixes un-
alterably the pattern of succession in France and serves to reduce the will
to an ancilliary role, less frequently used in France as the principal instru-
ment for transmission of property than in this country or in England.
In support of the French system, it is argued that the reserve portion
of lineal relatives has a cohesive effect on the family and strength-
ens the fabric of society. This is Planiol's idea when he explains the
basis of the forced share:
The moral obligation arises from the natural duties which tie
persons descending one from the other; the respect of the chil-
dren for the parents on one hand, and the paternal affection on
the other. . . . The social interest is based on the fact that the
family is the basic social group, which serves [as] a basis for all
other groups but is the most important of them. The state is a
nation and a nation is an agglomeration of families. Hence the
state is directly interested in a proper organization, durability
and stability of families.29
Thus, to Planiol the reserve is basic to the organization of society. 0
Though one may object to having natural ties ripen into moral obli-
gations enforceable in law, the community in France generally has ap-
proved imbuing the parental relationship with the legal consequences of
forced heirship. Even in the United States, most people would regard
disinheritance of a dutiful child by a whimsical or vindictive testator as
being unfair or even monstrously cruel."' On the other hand, freedom
of testation has at least superficial appeal in that it may be said to en-
27. CODE CiviL arts. 913-14.
28. CODE CIVIL arts. 920-30.
29. 3 PLANIOL, op. cit. su fra note 26, § 3049.
30. Planiol further explains that the obligation he refers to is not to be thought of
as part of the policy which imposes mutual alimentary obligations between parents
and children. Ibid.
31. That this is so is suggested by the results of a recent inquiry. COHEre, RO1sON
& BATEs, op. cit. szpra note 16.
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courage either self-reliance or respect for the parent on the part of the
child. The real or supposed dangers of inherited wealth to the well-being
of the offspring were best summed up long ago in Samuel Johnson's re-
mark that primogeniture should be preserved because it prevented there
being more than one fool in a family.32 On a popular level American ex-
altation of self-reliance and emphasis on freedom of opportunity, class
mobility and the self-made man have perhaps tarnished the image of the
man who owes his status largely to inherited wealth with its aura of ease,
unearned leisure and even decadence. To suggest that the child should
not be subject to disinheritance may evoke an image of a dissolute and
disrespectful son, slothful and unenterprising, secure in the knowledge
that he cannot be disinherited save for grave misconduct toward his
parent.
In sharp contrast to the democratic and laissez faire approach of the
Anglo-American law allowing freedom of testation within wide limits
stands the French system, with its emphasis on family property and blood
ties, conceived to promote family solidarity and to conserve family prop-
erty. Inherent in the system of children's forced succession to most of
the deceased parent's property is an espousal of the proposition that the
blood tie has a relatively more fixed, static quality when compared to the
marital relationship, subject as the latter is to a great variety of arrange-
ments as to its economic consequences, and perhaps more subject than the
former to variation as to the form of personal relationship. Today in
France the main channel for property transmission continues to be one in
which property is forced from parent to child.33 In each case, however,
32. McMurray, Modern Limitatiomvs on Liberty of Testation, in RATIONAL BASIS
OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 461 (Wigmore & Kocourek ed. 1923).
Western Auto Supply, one of the big enterprises operating by franchises to small
businessmen who sell its products and use its name and sales methods, "frowns on in-
herited money because it thinks that people who have had to earn their own will know
better how to manage a shop." Time, May 24, 1963, p. 90.
The classical economists, especially McCullock, argued strongly against the
legitim [forced share] and in favor of primogeniture as a social institution, on
the double ground that division of property operated against the efficient ex-
ploitation and that the disinheriting of younger children gave them maximum
incentive to make their own way in the world. A secure competence they re-
garded as disastrous both for society and for the individual who enjoyed it;
and they urged that men would be spurred on to make best use of their powers
only by need and by emulation of the rich. Inequality was defended as a means
of accumulation of capital and primogeniture favored on the ground that al-
though it might be bad for the heir by making him lazy it was good for the
younger children and the community. According to McCullock it was a positive
privilege to be disinherited; but it never entered his head that the best thing
would be to disinherit everybody.
Cole, Inheritance, 8 ENcyc. Soc. Sci. 35, 37 (1932).
33. See Merryman, Policy, Autonomy and the INumerus Clausus in Italian and
American Property Law, 12 Am. J. ComP. L. 224 (1963) for a discussion of the social
269
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the rights of each of the components of the immediate family-parents,
spouse and children of the deceased-must be worked out with reference
to the rights of the others and the right of the deceasd to control trans-
mission by will oir gift of some of his property to them and to outsiders.
This system may seem strange to Americans, steeped in a tradition
of freedom of testation and confirmed in a belief that inherited wealth
carries with it a slight taint. Among Americans of moderate means the
customary pattern, as Professor Dunham's study shows, is for property
to pass to the surviving spouse and then to the children. The pattern is
voluntary since there is no legal machinery to insure its being followed
beyond the limits of the spouse's indefeasible share. Yet under typical
intestacy statutes the surviving spouse's share varies depending upon
whether children survive, and the amount of the children's share depends
upon whether the spouse survives, thus suggesting that the French ap-
proach is not wholly alien to American law. Since children in the United
States have no indefeasible rights, however, it is apparent that the Con-
tinental system of forcing integration of their rights with the rights of
the surviving spouse remains untried in the United States, save for
Louisiana. Integration of the rights of spouse, children and parents of
the deceased seems the more reasonable when it is pointed out, as Wedge-
wood did in his argument for restricting inheritance rights, that this is
the group among which a communal sharing of property is ordinarily
confined." Be that as it may, it could be argued that the concomitant
rigidity of a system of forced heirship makes any adaptation of it beyond
the spouse's indefeasible share unsuitable and unacceptable to Americans.
Since forced heirship must have profound effects on social and economic
institutions and a significance far beyond the prevention of hardship
from disinheritance, it does not necessarily follow that forced heirship
is suitable for the United States even though it may work well on the
Continent. Though social and economic mobility has no doubt increased
and economic consequences of the American system and the Italian system of forced
heirship, the leggittinur, closely resembling the French. The author sees the development
of our law of trusts and future interests as a natural response in a system in which
disinheritance of children is permitted; by trusts a property owner can to some extent
prevent his successors from giving away the family's wealth. A similarity between the
trustee and the Italian property owner is perceived:
The Italian owner could with some accuracy be described as a kind of trustee
of that part of his property which will be subject to forced heirship, with a
life interest in a power to sell, reinvest and consume. He is not empowered to
make gifts of this property during life or at death, and if he is extremely im-
provident he may be classified as a profligate and his power over the property
further limited .
Id. at 231.
34. WEDGEWOoD, THE EcONoICS OF INHERITANCE 193 (1929).
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in France in the last 150 years, it may be that such mobility is still much
less than in the United States. A high degree of economic mobility is
perhaps a reason for urging rejection of forced heirship so as to permit
a parent to discriminate against a child who has attained wealth and in
favor of one who has not. On the other hand, examination of the French
and other civil law systems, their practical operation and effects, may
well compel the conclusion that they are a promising source for shaping
the revision of the American law as to the rights of the surviving spouse
and children.
II. THE FRENCH SYSTEM
A system of property transmission may be examined with reference
to three questions as to the rights of surviving family of a deceased per-
son: (1) what is the least amount of property that may be left to a per-
son or group standing in a particular relationship to the deceased; (2)
what amount of property, if any, will go to this person or group if the
decedent has not purported to control the disposition of his property by
will or gift, and (3) what is the maximum amount, if there is any limi-
tation at all, of the decedent's property which may be given to a person or
group. If these questions are answered regarding the surviving spouse,
the outlines of a particular system are revealed, and the surviving spouse's
position in the system of succession may be appraised.
By that method of analysis the position of the surviving spouse in
French law will be examined first as it exists today,35 and then as the
Commission for the Revision of the Civil Code " has proposed to revise
it. A preliminary word as to the Commission's recommendations is ap-
propriate. A proposed augmentation of the rights of the surviving
spouse is the most significant change that the Commission has made in
the area of gifts and successions. In explaining the proposal the Com-
mission declares that "the spouse is, indeed, in the matter of devolution
of property the great beneficiary of the reform." 7  The rationale for
the proposed change is stated as follows:
The most important reform of the rules of succession con-
cerns the surviving spouse who, under our present legislation,
is not a successor in full ownership except in the absence of
35. Important changes were made in 1957 and 1963.
36. See Houin, Reform of the French Civil Code and the Code of Commerce, 4
AM. J. Comp. L. 485 (1955) for an outline of the origins of the Commission, its mode
of operation and objectives.
37. 2 AVANT-PRojET DE CODE CIVML, PRPSENT A MONSIEUR LE GARDE DES SCEAUX
MINISTRE DE LA JUSTICE PAR LA COMMISSION DE REFORME DU CODE CIVIL, DEUXIME
PARTiE 21 (1962) (hereinafter cited as COMMIssION).
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legitimate parents and [legitimate or] illegitimate children; this
situation is not consonant with the present-day conception of
the modem family which seldom embraces more than the part-
ners to the marriage and the issue born of the marriage; it seems
only right that the spouse should be made an heir before dis-
tant relatives of the deceased, and that he should be put in
the status of one who shares along with the closest relatives.
The proposed provisions accord to the surviving spouse in every
case a right of succession in full ownership and make him a
true heir.3"
No basic change in the present outlines of a child's (or descendant of a
deceased child's) share in intestacy and his reserve share is contemplated
by the Commission's proposals. Frequent reference must be made to
the children's position in the scheme of succession and, indeed, to the po-
sitions of ancestors, collateral relatives and strangers to the blood of the
deceased spouse to understand the position of the surviving spouse.
A. Minimum Rights of the Surviving Spouse
1. Pension Alimentaire. In considering minimum rights of the
surviving spouse under French law, situations can easily be imagined
under the present scheme where he or she has none."0 For example, con-
sider the situation of a middle-aged woman who, having inherited from
her parents sufficient property to provide for her support, marries a
retired businessman. In the contract fixing their marital property rights,
the couple adopts the usual community property arrangement limited to
gains during the marriage (community of acquests). Because the
husband is retired, there may well be no gains. We may further suppose
that the husband, the predeceasing spouse, has by will or gift disposed
of all his property in favor of remote relatives or strangers, a permissible
disposition under French law when he is not survived by reserve heirs.
Or supposing he is survived by such heirs, e.g., children of a former mar-
riage, they succeed to most of his property, having indefeasible rights ex-
cept in cases of grave misconduct toward the deceased. The freely dis-
posable portion may be left by will partly to them and partly to friends.
The surviving spouse would then take nothing. She is not a reserve heir
nor indeed an heir at all, and there is no community property.
In the above example the wife had inherited property from her fam-
ily. The widow (or widower) has no indefeasible rights in the deceased
38. Id. at 69.
39. There is no distinction on the basis of sex as to rights of a surviving spouse in
French law.
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husband's separate property (or his share of any community property)
unless she is left in need. In that case article 205 of the Civil Code'
accords the surviving spouse a claim for support-a pension alimentaire-
against the succession of the deceased spouse that is superior to all other
rights in the estate except the claims of creditors. 4 The French spouse's
claim is itself looked upon as a claim of a creditor, the code providing
that the succession owes support to the surviving spouse left in need. The
surviving spouse as creditor does not, however, stand on equal footing
with other creditors of the deceased, nor is his right protected against
defeasance by the predeceasing spouse's inter vivos gifts to third parties,4"
a frailty it shares with the American spouse's right to an indefeasible
share. In view of the elaborate safeguards in French law against de-
feasance of the reserve share by inter vivos transfer, it is perhaps sur-
prising that no analogous protection is afforded the spouse.
While article 205 speaks of the succession as being obligated, it is
the heirs and legatees, as in the case of other obligations of the deceased,
who owe support. As in Anglo-American law, the succession or estate is
not a legal entity and hence is not capable of being an obligor. 3 The al-
lowance, superior to rights of inheritance, is borne by all the heirs, and in
case of insufficiency, proportionately by specific legatees.44
The pen-ion alimentaire has the obvious merit of forcing provision
for a surviving spouse so as to prevent his becoming a public charge or a
burden upon relatives. At the same time it denies him more than support
when such minimal rights are arguably appropriate, as when the mar-
riage was of short duration, when the predeceasing spouse left children
40. "Children owe support to their father and mother and other ascendants who
are in need. The succession of the predeceasing spouse is likewise obligated in the
same circumstances to the surviving spouse. Such a claim must be made within one
year after death or before completion of any partition of the deceased's property."
CODE CIvIL art. 205.
41. With rare exceptions such as Maine in the case of widows and Florida in the
case of minor children, such a right to support is unknown in American law except
during the period of administration by virtue of family allowance statutes. FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 733.20 (1963); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 156, § 14 (1954). See notes 22-23
supra and accompanying text as to the right of support accorded the surviving spouse
and dependent children by the English Inheritance (Family Provision) Act and other
legislation throughout much of the British Commonwealth.
42. 4 RiPERT & BOULANGER, Op. cit. supra note 26, § 1757.
43. While in the case of a statutory right to support claimed from a person, e.g.,
a parent's claim under article 205 for support from an adult child, and not the succes-
sion, article 208 provides that the pertinent considerations in setting the allowance are
the needs of the claimant and the fortune of the person owing support. The only limit
on the amount of the succession which may be absorbed by the pension alimentaire
seems to be the need of the surviving spouse. CODE CIVIL art. 208.
44. CODE CIVIL art. 205.
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of a prior marriage or when the usual sentiments did not attend the
relationship.
Unlike the pension alimentaire, the American spouse's forced share
of a fixed portion of the predeceasing spouse's property, if it is intended
primarily as a means of providing support, will often be excessive or in-
sufficient, depending upon the wealth of the predeceasing spouse. As the
only restriction on freedom of disposition of separate property in regard
to the surviving spouse under the present French system, the pension
alimentaire imposes a modest and needed restriction. The existence of
the surviving spouse's right to support answers in some measure the
argument that the spouse should be a reserve heir, as under the German
system which, however, accords no support allowance." The proposals
of the Commission follow the German pattern by eliminating the pension
alimentaire of the surviving spouse and according him a reserve share.
2. Rights in Community Property. The French spouse's right in
community property is distinct from the right to support from the de-
ceased spouse's succession and is typically of greater practical significance
among propertied classes. The merit of the realistic approach of a com-
munity property system and the wisdom of permitting the spouses to
determine the economic consequences of their marriage have been often
and persuasively discussed.46  Most commonly the surviving spouse in
France, as in community property jurisdictions in the United States, suc-
ceeds to one-half of the community property. In the great majority of
cases in which the parties have entered into a marriage contract fixing
property rights, this consists of a community of acquests-gains to the
community, by the activities of the spouses and income from separate
property. This is by far the most usual regime when any substantial
amount of property is brought to the marriage. If there is no marriage
contract adopting a separation of property or a marital property regime, as
there often is not among persons of modest means, by article 1393 there
results the statutory community which consists of all property and income
therefrom except real property brought to the marriage or acquired by
gift thereafter." However, article 1387 gives the parties to the marriage
complete freedom to contract in making their conventions regarding
property, thereby permitting them to avoid the statutory community."8
45. BfRGERLICHES GESETZBUCE §§ 2303-38 (Ger. 21st ed. Palandt 1962).
46. See, e.g., RHEISTEIN, THE CODE AND THE FAmILY IN THE CODE NAPOLEON
AND THE ComoN LAW WORLD 139 (Schwartz ed. 1956).
47. CODE Civil art. 1393. See CODE CiviL arts. 1401-08 for a definition of what
property is included in the community absent agreement otherwise. It has been recom-
mended that the statutory community be changed to a community of acquests. RHEIN-
STEIN, op. cit. supra note 46, at 154.
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The spouses, by article 1520, may vary in any manner the otherwise equal
division upon dissolution of the community, and article 1526 provides
that by the marriage contract the parties may agree that the survivor of
them shall take all of the community property, however that may be de-
fined. If such a convention is adopted, the predeceasing spouse's half
does not become part of the succession subject to the rights of reserve
heirs.40 The conventional marital property regime must be elected, if at
all, at the time the marriage is entered into; once done or omitted it can
never be changed." Likewise, the statutory community regime resulting
from the absence of a convention as to property cannot be changed."
While article 1421 accords to the husband alone the right to manage com-
munity property, article 1422 prohibits him from depleting that property
ky making gifts of it without the consent of the wife, 2 even denying to
him power to make gifts to their children. 3
It becomes clear that once a community property regime has been
established, each spouse acquires rights which cannot be defeated by the
other. However, since the parties are not required to adopt such a regime,
but may instead choose to keep their existing property and future gains
separate," it is possible that the surviving spouse will have no rights
48. "The Law does not regulate the conjugal association as to property except in
the absence of a special convention, which the spouses can make as they see fit, sub-
ject to the modifications that follow, so long as it is not contrary to good morals."
CODE CIVIL art. 1387. Another article further articulates this freedom: "The spouse can
modify the legal community by any sort of convention not contrary to article 1387,
1388, 1389, and 1390." CODE CIVIL art. 1497.
49. See text accompanying notes 101-07 infra. for restrictions on property arrange-
ments between parties of a marriage when there are children of a prior marriage.
50. CODE CIVIL arts. 1395, 1520, 1526. The Commission for Revision of the Civil
Code has recommended that postnuptial changes be permitted with judicial control
under some circumstances. CommIsSION art. 360.
51. This element of rigidity is not present in American community property sys-
tems; in nearly all community property states spouses have power by mutual assent to
convert community property into separate property of either the husband or wife at
any time. In Texas, however, the constitution prohibits changing of separate property
into community property. TEX. Co NsT. art. XVI, § 15 (1948) ; see 2 AMFRICAN LAW
OF PROPERTY §§ 7.26-.27 (Casner ed. 1952).
52. CODE CIVIL arts. 1421-22. Similar protection for the wife exists in most
American community property states, although the prohibition is often less clear cut.
It is said that the husband, as manager of community property, can make reasonable
gifts of community property to third persons if done without a fraudulent intent to
defeat the wife's rights. This statement imports a host of uncertainties common to
transactions involving marital rights in which fraudulent intent is an element. See 2
AMIERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 7.22 (Casner ed. 1952); Huie, Community Property
Laws as Applied to Life Insurance, 18 TEXAS L. REv. 121 (1940).
53. Prior to 1942 this article provided that the husband could not make gifts of
the community's real property, nor of anything but specific items of personalty unless
all or a portion of the personalty was for the benefit of the children of the spouses.
54. A special sort of separate property regime now fallen into disuse is the dotal
regime, whereby property is transferred, typically by the wife's parents, to the husband
for his administration during the marriage, the income to be applied for living expenses.
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whatsoever in community property. His or her sole right may be to a
pension alimentaire. It may also happen that rights in community prop-
erty are without value, as when fortune has failed to smile on the couple
except, perhaps, to the extent of preserving the separate property of the
predeceasing spouse in which the survivor has no indefeasible rights.
Again the significance of the pension alimentaire is evident, assuring the
surviving spouse that he or she will never be left in need to the extent
the predeceasing spouse leaves assets in excess of his debts. Bearing on
the circumstance of need may be the existence of indefeasible rights in
community property. Beyond this the surviving spouse has no rights un-
der the existing law when the predeceasing spouse has chosen to make use
of the freedom of disposition the law affords in order to prevent any
property from passing to the survivor. The Commission for Revision
of the Civil Code makes the revolutionary proposal that the spouse be
given indefeasible right by making him a reserve heir, in effect treating
him as an additional child.
B. Family Rights When the Deceased Has Made No Disposition
The spouse's rights in cases where the predeceasing spouse has made
no gifts and left no will must now be examined, together with situations
where he has made dispositions by gift or will of less than the maximum
permitted under the circumstances. Here, as always, the surviving spouse
left in need has a right to a pension alimentaire. In these situations, how-
ever, his need will be affected by his rights to a life interest (usufruit) or
to full ownership (pleine propridt ) of a portion or all of the property of
the succession, as well as by possible rights in community property.
Rights to a pension alimentaire and in community property are, of course,
independent of rights which arise when the predeceasing spouse dies in-
testate and of rights the surviving spouse may have as a donee or legatee
of the property of the predeceasing spouse.
It will become apparent that here, unlike the situation examined
above where the predeceasing spouse has sought to limit as much as pos-
Upon dissolution of the marriage, the property reverts to the wife or her heirs. Fre-
quently a dotal regime was combined with a community property regime. The term
"dot" is also used, of course, to signify gifts of parents of either husband or wife
though not under the statutory dotal regime. CODE CIVIL arts. 1540-73. See generally 4
RIPERT & BOIJLANGER, op. cit. mcpra note 26, pt. 1, ch. 3.
The parties to the marriage might also arrange their property rights by an ant-
nuptial contract known as institution contractiewle, a hybrid arrangement partaking
partly of the nature of a contract and partly that of a will. One of the future spouses
irrevocably undertakes to leave to the other spouse all or part of his estate. The in-
stitution contractuelle may include a spouse's separate property and property to be
acquired in the future. CODE CIVIL arts. 1082-84; see 4 RiERT & BOULANGER, Op cit.
supra note 26, §§ 3765-67.
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sible the survivor's rights, his rights are determined according to which
relatives survive with whom he is in competition. Preliminarily, it must
be observed that the rights of the spouse can never impugn the rights of
reserve heirs-the lineal descendants of the deceased spouse or, in their
absence, his parents or closest surviving lineal ancestor.55 The surviving
spouse's rights when the deceased spouse has not exercised all or part of
the power to dispose of property by gift or will which the law accords
him in the particular circumstances are set forth in article 767.58
1. Children Surviving. First to be considered is the surviving
spouse's position when the predeceasing spouse is survived by children
or descendants of deceased children. 7 If there are one or more children
of the marriage, the surviving spouse, not legally separated by reason of
his fault at the time of death,"s takes a life interest in one-quarter of the
succession." That interest may readily be criticized as insufficient, and
55. Lineal ancestors other than parents are heirs only if the deceased was not
survived by brothers and sisters or their descendants. CoDE Civ. art. 750. Hence they
are reserve heirs only in the same circumstances.
56. CODE CIVIL art. 767. That is to be contrasted with the situation where the
predeceasing spouse has sought to limit the survivor's rights as much as possible. See
notes 39-54 supra and accompanying text.
Article 767 presently sets the share of the surviving spouse as follows:
When the deceased leaves neither relatives within the degree capable of taking
the succession, nor illegitimate children, or if he leaves only collaterals other
than brothers and sisters or their descendants, the property of the succession
belongs in full ownership to the undivorced spouse who survives him and
against whom does not exist a judgment of separation.
When the deceased leaves in one line no relative within the permissible
degree, or if he leaves in this line only collaterals other than brothers or
sisters or their descendants, half of his succession passes, notwithstanding the
provisions of article 753, to the undivorced spouse against whom there does not
exist a judgment of separation.
The undivorced surviving spouse who does not succeed in full ownership
and against whom there does not exist any judgment of separation has in the
succession of the predeceasing spouse a life interest (droit d'wrszfruit) which is
Of a quarter, if the deceased leaves one or more children of the marriage;
Of the portion of the legitimate child taking the least, not to exceed one-
quarter, if the deceased has children born of a preceding marriage;
Of one-half, if the deceased leaves illegitimate children or their descend-
ants, brothers and sisters, descendants of brothers and sisters or ancestors ...
CODE CIVIL art. 767.
57. The code provides for unlimited representation in the case of lineal descend-
ants. CODE CIvIL art. 740.
58. Such separation does not affect the right to support. CODE CIVIL art. 205.
59. The spouse's rights in this situation have been so fixed since 1891, such rights
coming into the code simultaneously with the pension alimentaire. Before 1891 the
spouse acquired no interest except in the most unlikely circumstances that the deceased
spouse left no relatives within the twelfth degree of consanguinity, in which case he
took the entire succession.
If the deceased has children living of a prior marriage, article 767 imposes special
limitations. See text accompanying notes 101-07 infra. The spouse is not an heir; his
right is said to be against the succession and not in the succession. He is an irregular
successor (successeur irregidier) as is the state in cases of escheat under French law.
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the Commission for the Revision of the Civil Code has proposed that the
spouse's rights in this situation be increased to full ownership in not less
than one-fourth."0
It has been said that the surviving spouse takes as a presumptive
donee.6 That is, his life interest (or full interest in some cases, as will
be seen) is what the predeceasing spouse would have given him had not
death intervened. The presumption is not, however, that the predeceas-
ing spouse would have given the survivor all the law would permit, but
rather, the interests ab intestat specified in article 767. Regardless of
whether reserve heirs survive or not, nothing prevents complete extinction
of the surviving spouse's rights under that article by inter vivos or testa-
mentary dispositions of the predeceasing spouse. It must also be noted
that all gifts made to the spouse62 inter vivos or by will are counted in the
calculation of the spouse's life interest under article 767, reducing it pro
tanto or extinguishing it entirely.6" Thus the interest accorded the sur-
The Commission for Revision of the Civil Code proposes making the surviving spouse
an heir. CoMMISSION art. 768.
In the context of determining the surviving spouse's interest in the succession, the
calculation of such interest is based upon the predeceasing spouse's share of community
property and his separate property undisposed of by gift or will, to which are added,
for the purpose of this calculation only, advancements to heirs. CODE CIVIL art. 767,
para. 8. (Advancements are lifetime gifts intended to count toward the intestate or
reserve share that the heir will take upon the death of the donor; an advancement may
be made either to a reserve heir or a collateral heir.) This is the mass of property on
which the maximum extent of the life interest (one-quarter or one-half) is calculated.
The extent of property over which the life interest can be exercised (as distinguished
from calculated) does not include advancements, absolute gifts, legacies, nor the reserve
portion. For example, if a predeceasing spouse leaving two children had made advance-
ments to each of them of 250,000 francs, and had not disposed of 100,000 francs at the
time of his death, while the surviving spouse's life interest would be calculated on the
basis of 600,000 francs (twice 250,000 plus 100,000) and could therefore be as much as
150,000 francs (one-fourth of 600,000), it could in this instance be enjoyed only as to
property not transferred by the deceased-the 100,000 francs he possessed at death.
Because the surviving spouse is not a reserve heir, in regard to him property which the
deceased has disposed of by gifts or will has ceased to be part of the succession and he
can claim no interest in it. Unlike the advancement, the absolute gift or legacy is not
included in the fictional reconstruction to determine the maximum amount in which the
spouse may have a life interest.
By changing one fact in the above example so as to make the advancements to each
child 200,000 francs (instead of 250,000), the decedent spouse would possess 200,000
francs at death and the surviving spouse would enjoy the maximum life interest of
150,000 francs, since an amount in excess of this remains undisposed of at the death of
the predeceasing spouse.
60. CoMMISSION art. 769.
61. 3 COLIN & CAPITANT, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS § 954 (10th ed. de la
Morandi~re 1950).
62. By article 1096 all interspousal lifetime gifts are revocable. CODE CIVIL art.
1096. The Commission's proposal would subject interspousal gifts to ordinary rules
governing gifts. CommissioN art. 986; see discussion in CoMMISSlON 97.
63. The maximum which the predeceasing spouse can give inter vivos or by will
to the survivor is always greater than the amount the survivor would take under article
767. If no reserve heirs survive, there is no limitation on gifts inter vivos or by will to
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vivor under the particular circumstances cannot be tacked onto gifts
or legacies so as to allow the spouse a total of more than the interest
he is entitled to by article 767. The only means by which the prede-
ceasing spouse can benefit the survivor to the fullest extent is by gifts or
legacies to the maximum permitted in the particular circumstances.
To illustrate the extent of the spouse's right, let us suppose that a
deceased husband has left property comprised of his separate property
and his share of community property of a total value of 100,000 francs.6"
He is survived by a wife and one child, whose reserve share is one-half of
the succession, or 50,000 francs.65 The other half, the free share (quotitj
disponible) of 50,000 francs, may be disposed of by gift or will. Let us
further suppose that a legacy of 40,000 francs from the free share has
been left to a friend. Since the wife's life interest (here, in one-quarter)
can never impinge upon the rights of a reserve heir, and since much of
the free share has been exhausted by the legacy of 40,000 francs to the
friend, the life interest of the wife is in only 10,000 francs-the
amount which is not part of the reserve and which has not been given to
the friend. The reversionary interest (neu proprijt6) in this amount
passes to the son as the sole heir in addition to his reserve.66 It will not
pass to the wife unless the husband gives it to her, even though with the
reversion she might still receive something less valuable than her life in-
any person. Paragraph 10 of article 767 provides that the surviving spouse may not
exercise his right thereunder if he has received gifts in excess of the value of his
rights under article 767, even though such gift was intended to favor him without
diminishing his rights. However, there is a recent decision to the effect that this does
not apply when the donor spouse has manifested his wish that the gift should be in
addition. Judgment of May 10, 1960 of the Cour de Cassation (Ch. cio., IRre sect. civ.),
Dalloz 63.38. If the gift is worth less than his rights under article 767, he can claim
only the balance between the gift and the value of his interest under that article. Valua-
tion questions arise in equating the value of outright gifts of land or chattels with life
interest accorded by the article. CODE CIvIL art. 767.
While the spouse has no right to demand it, if the heirs agree, and furnish suf-
ficient sureties, the life interest may be converted into a life annuity of equivalent value.
CODE CIVIL art. 767, para. 11. If the heirs are in disagreement, such conversion is in the
discretion of the court.
64. See example in 3 COLIN & CAPITANT, op. cit. supra note 61, § 956.
65. CODE CIVIL art. 913. That article is actually phrased with reference to the
free share: "Gifts, either inter vivos or by will, cannot exceed half of the property of
the one making the disposition if he leaves at death a single child, one-third if he
leaves two children, one-fourth if he leaves three or more." Ibid.
The adopted child (or his descendants) has a right to the usual reserve share from
the adopting parent, and loses such right as to his natural parents. CODE CIVr art. 356.
As to the reserve share of illegitimate children, see not 78 infra.
66. To the extent that the predeceasing spouse survived by a child or children
makes no disposition of the free portion, the entire succession passes to the children
subject to the surviving spouse's life interest in one-quarter. CODE CIvIL art. 745.
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terest in a quarter of the succession on which her right is calculated."'
Assuming the facts of the previous example except that the couple
had two children instead of one, the interest of the surviving spouse
would be completely defeated. While the calculation of her life interest
remains the same, there is no property on which it can be exercised be-
cause the free share (one-third when two children survive) of 33,333
francs has been exceeded in the attempted legacy to the friend of 40,000
francs;8 the rights of reserve heirs cannot be impaired for her benefit.
The surviving spouse's life interest in one-quarter seems particularly
ungenerous when only one child survives and the freely disposable por-
tion is one-half. But regardless of the extent of the right, since it is
defeasible, its effectiveness as a means of providing support is far from
complete. The survivor may find his only rights to be a support allow-
ance in case of need and in community property, if any.
That the spouse's right under article 767 is merely a life interest in
an inflexibly fixed amount when children survive indicates that it is pres-
ently conceived as a means of providing support, and not as a channel for
transmitting family property.69 This feature it shares with the Anglo-
American device of dower. Unlike dower, as to which inchoate rights
can be acquired at marriage or any time thereafter when the husband
becomes seized of real property, the spouse's right can, as we have seen,
be destroyed by inter vivos or testamentary disposition of the freely dis-
posable share of the deceased's property. Further, a dower interest is
limited to real property, while the interest of the French spouse under
article 767 applies indifferently to all property. Dower rights operate
only in favor of the wife, while the rights of the surviving spouse in
French law are the same regardless of sex. Again unlike dower, the sur-
viving spouse's interest in the succession becomes progressively larger as
the relatives with whom such spouse is in competition become more re-
motely related to the deceased spouse.7"
67. The friend's legacy of 40,000 francs is excluded from the calculation of the
spouse's right. If the husband had not left 40,000 francs to the friend, the base for
calculation would be 100,000 francs and the wife's life interest would be in 25,000
francs. See note 59 mtpra.
68. The amount of the legacy in excess of the free share (40,000 less 33,333) will
not be given effect over the objections of the children, the reserve heirs.
69. Since 1917, however, the spouse's interest has not ceased upon remarriage even
when descendants survive.
70. If brothers and sisters, but not parents or descendants, survive, and the deceased
spouse has made no gifts or legacies, the brothers and sisters take everything, subject
to the surviving spouse's life interest in one-half. CoDE C iv art. 750. If any property
has been disposed of by the deceased (and here all of it may be disposed of in favor
of any person), the portion as to which the surviving spouse can exercise his rights is
pro tanto reduced. See the first example in the text at note 59 supra, where 40,000
francs had been given to a stranger. Regardless of whether brothers and sisters survive,
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2. No Lineal Descendants Surviving. The surviving spouse's in-
terest under article 767, always defeasible by inter vivos gift or will, is
increased to a life interest in one-half of the succession when no legitimate
children or their descendants survive the deceased, but he is survived by
any of the following: illegitimate children or their legitimate children;
brothers and sisters or their descendants; lineal ancestors in both lines.
A 1957 revision of article 767 resulted in a striking enlargement of the
surviving spouse's interest ab itestat in the succession. The spouse now
succeeds to full ownership if the predeceasing spouse leaves no lineal rela-
tives (including illegitimate children), brothers or sisters or their descend-
ants."' From 1925 until 1957 the spouse in this situation took a life in-
terest in the entire succession and the closest ordinary collaterals (those
other than brothers and sisters and their descendants, who are preferred
collaterals) in each line through the sixth degree of consanguinity shared
equally in the reversionary interest. After 1930, if there were no col-
laterals in one line capable of taking, the surviving spouse took one-half
outright.7
2
if parents survive, being reserve heirs, their share (one-fourth each in full ownership)
will not be diminished to protect the surviving spouse's life interest since the latter can
never impair the right of reserve heirs. Brothers and sisters, if any, take the other
half, assuming gifts or legacies have not consumed it, subject to the spouse's life in-
terest (CODE CivIL art. 748), and if no brothers and sisters survive, the entire succes-
sion goes to the surviving parents, subject to the spouse's life interest in one-half. CoDE
CIVIL art. 753. If but one parent survives, the spouse takes the other half in full
ownership.
71. If only brothers and sisters of the half blood, or an ancestor in but one line
survives, the surviving spouse takes one-half of the succession outright. CODE Civm art.
767.
72. Subject to the rights of the surviving spouse, if any, intestate succession is as
follows: when no lineal descendants survive, the parents share equally with brothers
and sisters and their descendants (CODE CIVIL art. 748) ; if but one parent survives, the
brothers and sisters take three-quarters. CODE CIvIL art. 751. Brothers and sisters take all
to the exclusion of more remote lineal ascendants (CODE CIVIL art. 750), the nearest of
whom in each line then sharing equally. If an ancestor in but one line survives, he takes
all unless the spouse survives, in which case it is shared equally. Thereafter, the surviving
spouse takes all, and if none, the succession is split in half and the nearest surviving col-
laterals in each line, through the sixth degree of consanguinity, share equally. If there are
none in one line, then the entire succession goes to the line with such collaterals surviving.
CODE CIvIL art. 755. Determination of consanguinity is made by the civil law system of
counting from the deceased to a common ancestor and back down to the person whose de-
gree of relationship is to be determined. (Lineal relatives and descendants of brothers and
sisters can take beyond the sixth degree.) Since 1917 succession has been limited to the
sixth degree unless the deceased at the time of his death lacked the mental capacity to
make a will, in which case succession was permitted to the twelfth degree from the
adoption of the code until 1917.
Primogeniture was abolished in the wake of egalitarian influences after the French
Revolution. See discussion in 4 ,PERT & BOULANGE R, op. cit. supra note 26, § 1477.
Since there is no doctrine of ancestral property, unless a gift is made upon a condition
of return (sitccession anomale) it is apparent that when the succession is split in two
equal parts, one for each line, property may pass out of the blood line of the ancestor
from whom it was acquired by the deceased. For criticism of the system of splitting
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Since the surviving spouse is now preferred to ordinary collaterals,
there is a sharp difference in result depending upon whether, for example,
an uncle or a nephew survives to compete with the surviving spouse. If
the predeceasing spouse, survived by a brother or his descendants, dis-
poses of none or less than half of his property, the surviving spouse has
a life interest in one-half of the succession-a seemingly niggardly treat-
ment of the spouse." The brother or the nephew takes the entire suc-
cession in intestacy subject only to the spouse's life interest in one-half.
However, when only an uncle survives, the spouse now takes all in full
ownership, an unreasonably disparate treatment of the spouse in these
two similar situations. Regardless of whether it is an uncle or a nephew
who survives, neither being reserve heirs, the predeceasing spouse can
give any amount of the succession to his spouse, or to anyone else for
that matter. Though he may have wanted the spouse to take everything,
he may have neglected to make disposition in favor of the spouse, pro-
crastinating in a transaction which often invites distasteful thoughts of
death. Under the proposals of the Commission for Revision of the Civil
Code the present objections are eliminated, the spouse being preferred to
the exclusion of all collaterals7 4
3. Commission's Proposal. Since the Commission does not wish
to disrupt the existing system as it pertains to descendants, its basic
approach is to assimilate the surviving spouse into the pattern by treating
him as an additional child, resulting in a concomitant reduction in the
children's shares."5 For example, when a spouse and one child survive
and the predeceasing spouse has not purported to dispose of any property,
the Commission's proposal would result in the spouse's taking one-half
and the child's taking one-half, just as though two children and no spouse
had survived, the two children sharing equally the entire succession.
Thus, the surviving spouse succeeds to some property in full ownership
ab intestat regardless of the kind of relatives of the deceased with whom
the succession equally between the paternal and maternal lines (1a fente) see ROUAST,
COURS DE DROIT CML APPROFONDI 46 (1955).
73. CoDE CIVIL art. 750.
74. Commi~ussioNr art. 771.
75. Proposed article 769 embraces the essential change:
When the deceased leaves legitimate children or their descendants, the
surviving spouse has a right in the succession to the share of the legitimate
child taking the least, but not less than one-quarter of the succession.
The shares of children or descendants are, in this case, reduced proportion-
ately in the amount necessary to create the share of the spouse.
Id. art. 769.
When a spouse and illegitimate children survive, it is provided that the spouse takes.
one-half and the illegitimate children share the other half. When but one illegitimate




he is in competition. There is, however, one departure from the idea of as-
similation of the spouse as an additional child: the spouse can never take
less than one-quarter regardless of the number of children surviving-a
notion directed toward assuring the spouse a fixed minimum aliquot por-
tion which has been carried over from the present law as to the spouse's
rights to a life interest. The proposed treatment would, naturally, be
accompanied by the disappearance from the code of the spouse's rights as
presently set forth under article 767.
When there are no surviving children and the spouse is in competi-
tion with one or both of the parents of the deceased spouse, the Commis-
sion has proposed an intestate share of one-quarter for each parent, and
the balance of three-quarters or on,-half to the surviving spouse, depend-
ing on whether one or both parents survive."6 In this situation the sur-
viving spouse would in effect displace the brothers and sisters of the de-
ceased spouse, who have under the present code exactly the rights which
the Commission proposes to accord the spouse. When neither parent of
the predeceasing spouse survives, the surviving spouse would take every-
thing to the complete exclusion of grandparents, brothers and sisters and
more remote collateral relatives of the deceased. It is evident that these
proposals go far beyond the improvements made in the surviving spouse's
position by the 1957 amendments of article 767. The spouse would then
enjoy the status of a child except that, unlike a child, he would share one-
half or one-quarter of the succession with the parents of the predeceasing
spouse when no children survive.
C. Surviving Spouse's Maxaimum Rights
1. Spouse in Competition with Children. Finally it must be in-
quired what the maximum rights in property are that the predeceasing
spouse is permitted to transmit to the survivor. Here again the amount
depends upon who survives to compete with the spouse. If no reserve
heirs survive, everything may be disposed of by inter vivos gift or will in
favor of any person, including the surviving spouse. If, however, the
76. Id. art. 770.
77. Id. art. 771.
78. The reserve heirs' rights are established by articles 913-915, the first two of
which set forth the portion of property (ordinary disposable portion) which can be
disposed of by gift or will when one, two, and three or more legitimate (or legitimate
and illegitimate) children, or, if none, ancestors or an ancestor, survive the deceased.
CODE CivIL arts. 913-15. The illegitimate child's share in intestacy is fixed at half of
the legitimate child's share when both legitimate and illegitimate children survive. CODE
CIVIL art. 758. When both survive, illegitimate children, since 1896, have been expressly
accorded a reserve share of that proportion which they would have taken in intestacy, in
this case, one-half. CODE Civi. art. 913. When illegitimate children only survive, they do
not cut the parents of the deceased as reserve heirs, as do legitimate children. In such case,
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surviving spouse is in competition with children, their reserve shares as
established by article 913 must be borne in mind: gifts inter vivos or by
will cannot exceed half of his property if the deceased has left one child,
one-third if he leaves two children, and one-quarter if he leaves three or
more."9 The situation is complicated by article 1094 which modifies the
rights of reserve heirs in some situations by providing for a special dis-
posable portion for the surviving spouse when the deceased spouse is sur-
vived by descendants. Though a 1963 revision of article 1094 has
brougt about important changes, complexities remain.
The 1963 revision of article 1094 has virtually removed the basis for
criticism that the predeceasing spouse cannot be generous to the survi-
vor."0 Nonetheless, the recent change is not an abandonment of the idea
that family property must move principally from parent to child. That
article now provides three alternative limitations on the dispositions
which may be made in favor of the surviving spouse. First, the pre-
deceasing spouse may give him what he could have given a stranger (any-
one other than the spouse); this amount therefore depends upon the
number of children surviving.8 Second, he may give the surviving
spouse one-quarter in full ownership and a life interest in the remaining
three-quarters. This is a more valuable interest than the first alternative
unless the deceased spouse is survived by only one or two children and
the surviving spouse is elderly; in the latter instances outright ownership
of one-half or one-third might be more valuable. As a final alternative,
the predeceasing spouse can give the survivor a life interest in all is
property. Thus, the reserve portion may be subjected to a special and
in most cases augmented disposable share when the spouse and children
survive. If no disposition is made of the free share either to the spouse
or to third persons, the children will, of course, take it, subject only to
and also when brothers and sisters survive, the illegitimate children take in intestacy
three-quarters of the share they would have taken had they been legitimate (hence they
would take three-quarters of the succession). CODE CIvIL art. 759. Their reserve share is
likewise three-quarters of the legitimate's reserve share under the particular circum-
stances. CODE CIVIL art. 913. When illegitimate children and ordinary collaterals survive,
such children take the entire succession in intestacy. CODE: CIVIL art. 760. All the fore-
going applies only to illegitimate children legally recognized. CODE CIVIL art. 338.
Children of adulterous and incestuous relationships cannot be legally recognized (CODE
CIVIL art 342), a disability which the Commission proposes to abolish. In some situations,
however, such offspring would still have only a right to support from the deceased
parent. ComasIssioN art. 773.
Article 915 sets forth the reserve rights of illegitimate children when no legitimate
children survive. See note 93 infra.
79. Descendants of deceased children represent them.
80. The pre-1963 limitation on dispositions which could be made in favor of the
surviving spouse is harshly criticized in 4 RIPERT & BOULANGER, op. cit. supra note 26,§ 1900.
81. CODE Civm art. 913.
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the spouse's life interest in one-quarter under article 767.
The significance of the recent changes may be assessed in light of
the provisions which they supersede. Article 1094 formerly provided
that when children or their descendants were in competition with the sur-
viving spouse, the maximum amount which could be disposed of in favor
of the spouse was full ownership in a quarter of the property of the de-
ceased and a life interest in another quarter, or a life interest in one-
half." - In effect, the former law permitted the predeceasing spouse to
increase by one-fourth of his property the amount which the surviving
spouse would take over and above the life interest in one-quarter, the
amount the survivor would have taken, and would still take, by article
767 had the predeceasing spouse made no disposition of his property.
Like the life interest under article 767, the limit of the spouse's special
disposable share when children survived was fixed at one-quarter out-
right and a life interest in another quarter, regardless of the number of
children surviving. When one child and the spouse survived, the curious
result was that the predeceasing spouse could not use up the entire ordi-
nary disposable portion of one-half in favor of the survivor. A rever-
sionary interest (nue propridtd) in one-quarter of the husband's property
could not be disposed of in her favor, but could be disposed of in favor
of anyone else. It would perhaps shock those accustomed to the Ameri-
can law, its mandatory restrictions on freedom of testation directed solely
toward channelling property to a surviving spouse, to encounter a system
which mandatorily channelled property away from the spouse. Under
the 1963 amendments, however, the maximum permissible interest which
may be given to the spouse always includes the ordinary disposable share.
By so providing, the children's position will be improved if property is
kept away from an outsider, since property given to the surviving spouse
will constitute part of the property subject to the rights of the same re-
serve heirs, the children, upon the surviving spouse's death. Furthermore,
the children's future right to a reserve in property received by the surviv-
ing spouse will be seen to be well protected against the blandishments of a
subsequent spouse should the surviving spouse remarry.8 Obviously, to
the extent the surviving spouse is given a life interest, the permissible
extent of which was greatly increased in 1963, the value of the children's
reserve will be reduced by its postponement.8 "
82. Lifetime and at-death transfers are integrated in determining the property to
which the fractions are applied.
83. See notes 101-07 infra and accompanying text.
84. CoDEy Cwvm art. 1094. When there is a gift of a life interest to the spouse
in more than half of the deceased spouse's property, any child may as to his interest,
after furnishing appropriate sureties, require the life interest to be converted into an
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The concurrence of the spouse's special disposable share and the
ordinary disposable share has given rise to troublesome problems because
the two shares are not cumulative. Under the 1963 revision it would
seem that whenever the predeceasing spouse has made dispositions in fa-
vor of the surviving spouse to the limit of any of the three alternatives,8"
no disposition can be made in favor of a stranger. Concurrence of the
two shares can still raise questions when the special disposable share has
not been completely utilized. Again, when the predeceasing spouse sur-
vived by children makes gifts of the ordinary disposable share to persons
other than his spouse to the extent permitted by article 913, he may by so
doing have exhausted the special disposable share.86
As an example of the problems of concurrence, let us assume that the
husband, the predeceasing spouse, survived by three children, had made a
gift to the wife of a life interest in one-half of his property, a common
gift by antenuptial contract. Thereafter he made a gift to a third party.
For purposes of calculation, the gift to the wife must be converted, with
reference to her life expectancy, to its value in full ownership. If its
value so measured equals or exceeds the ordinary disposable portion
(one-quarter when three children survive) such portion has been held to
be exhausted, and no further gifts to third parties may be made."7 Thus,
if the wife's age was such to cause her life interest in one-half to be worth
half the value of the property in full ownership, the wife's interest would
be valued as one-fourth of the property in full ownership, and would
extinguish the ordinary free share. Under the reasonable assumption
that the husband has utilized first the special disposable portion, it seems
that a reversionary interest (nue proprigtg) in one-quarter should remain
of the ordinary free share. It has been accepted in such situations, how-
ever, that gifts in favor of the spouse and third persons not only cannot
be cumulated, but in combination cannot exceed the limits of the smaller
of the two types of free shares. This result has obtained only when the
dispositions were not made simultaneously to the spouse and the third
party. In situations other than those where a gift of a life interest to the
spouse must be revalued in full ownership, the essence of the interaction
of articles 913 and 1094 has been that both ordinary and special free
annuity. This does not apply to the dwelling occupied by the spouse and its furnishing.
Children are also given protection against misuse of the property by the surviving
spouse. Ibid.
85. See text accompanying note 81 supra.
86. CODE CIvIL art. 913. Gifts of life interests to a stranger from the ordinary
free share may be treated as gifts in full ownership of equal value for the purpose of
determining whether the free share has been exceeded. CODE Civi. art. 917.
87. Judgment of August 2, 1853, of the Cour de Cassation, Dalloz 53.1.300, Sirey
53.1.728; Judgment of December 20, 1871, Toulouse (Dalloz 73.2.17, Sirey 72.2.97.)
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shares must be kept within their respective limits and that when com-
bined they must be within the permissible limits either of the ordinary or
the special disposable share.
By the Commission's proposal, the surviving spouse is not only made
an heir but a reserve heir.88 This follows the concept previously encoun-
tered in the Commission's proposals for treatment of the spouse when no
disposition has been made, i.e., the assimilation of the spouse as an addi-
tional child. Under the proposal, when children survive, the spouse's
rights as riservataire are the same as those of the child taking the least,
ignoring the extent to which one child may be favored over another by
the freely disposable share." For example, if one child survived, the situ-
ation would be as though two children survived under the existing sys-
tem, one of the "children" being the spouse; the child and the spouse
would each have a reserve of one-third, and the final third would con-
stitute the free share. Unlike his intestate share, the spouse's reserve
share would be less than one-quarter when three or more children sur-
vive. Consistent with the Commission's other proposals to treat the
spouse like an additional child, it proposes the abolition of the special
disposable share, thus making only the ordinary free share applicable to
the spouse as it is to everyone else, including children. In every case the
spouse could then be given, in addition to his reserve, a free share equal
to that established by the present article 913. The benign simplification
which would result from the almost comprehensive assimilation of the
spouse to a child, eliminating such complicated features of the present law
as article 767 and the special disposable share, requires no emphasis. At
least the 1963 revision follows the Commission in one respect, however,
in that it permits any property which can be given to a stranger to be given
to the spouse.
The 1963 revision of article 1094 accords the spouse a greater maxi-
mum interest-one-quarter outright and a life interest in three-quarters-
than the proposals of the Commission in most situations where more than
one child survives. To state the relative positions with greater precision
is not possible because of the variable factor, the surviving spouse's age.
It is clear, however, that the legislature has leaned in favor of permitting
an abundant provision for the spouse by a life interest, rather than aug-
menting his possible interest in outright ownership although this too has
been increased. While it is the latter alternative which the Commission
has chosen, this difference can be overemphasized since, as has been noted,
the surviving spouse's property, including property acquired from the pre-
88. CommissioN art. 884.
89. Id. art. 886.
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deceasing spouse, is subject to a reserve in favor of the children on his
death. Under the Commission's proposal the maximum interest that
could be disposed of in favor of the spouse would be his reserve share,
counting him as an additional child, plus the free share. Thus, the
spouse's maximum would be two-thirds when one child survives, one-half
when two survive and seven-sixteenths when three survive."°
2. The Spouse in Competition with Ancestors and Collaterals.
When no legitimate children or their descendants survive, each line in
which an ancestor survives is entitled to one-quarter of the succession by
virtue of article 914, which provides that the freely disposable share can-
not exceed one-half when the deceased is survived by an ancestor in both
paternal and maternal lines, and three-quarters if he leaves an ancestor
in but one line.91 The nearer surviving ancestor in each line excludes the
more remote survivors of that line. Strangely, however, when that an-
cestor is more remote than the parent of the deceased and the deceased's
brothers and sisters or their descendants survive, the ancestor's reserve is
lost because brothers and sisters succeed to the exclusion of such ancestor.
Thus, since brothers and sisters are not reserve heirs, the entire succession
may be given to the surviving spouse when, for example, a brother and
a grandmother survive, but only three-quarters when the grandmother
but not the brother survives! The reason is that when an ancestor is
eliminated as an heir,92 he is a fortiori eliminated as a reserve heir.93 In
90. Nothing prevents the legislator from taking an additional step by making the
spouse a reserve heir. Were this to be done, however, the retention of the special
disposable share in the revision of article 1094 would suggest either further modifica-
tion of that article or modification of the Commission's technique of assimilating the
spouse to an additional child. The direction of the 1963 revision has doubtless disap-
pointed those who subscribe to the Commission's position that the spouse should be
given protection against defeasance equivalent to the child's.
91. In this situation it was noticed that the surviving spouse had a right to a life
interest in one-half of the succession if the predeceasing spouse had not defeated this
right by disposing of his property in favor of others. CODE CIvIL art. 767.
92. "In case of the prior death of the father and mother of a person dying with-
out lineal descendants, his brothers, sisters or their descendants are called to the suc-
cession to the exclusion of the ancestors and other collaterals." CODE CIVIL art. 750.
93. Similarly, parents are eliminated as reserve heirs when children survive, ex-
cept that special provision is made for the concurrence of parents and illegitimates as
reserve heirs:
When, in the absence of legitimate children, the deceased leaves both one or
more illegitimate children and ancestors in one or both lines, gifts inter vivos
or by will cannot exceed half of the property of the one so disposing if there
is but one illegitimate child; one-third if there are two, and one-quarter if
there are three or more. The property thus reserved will pass to the ancestor
in the amount of one-eighth of the succession, and the 'balance to the illegiti-
mate children.
CODE CIvIL art. 715. In such case all property not in the reserve can be given to the wife,
and, in addition, the predeceasing spouse can cut down the ancestor's interest to a life
interest in one-eighth.
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short, to be a reserve heir, one must first be an heir.
The fact that ancestors are entitled to a reserve may result in pre-
serving some or most of this property in the family, since the ancestor's
reserve share will upon his death become part of the succession which
may be subject to the reserve shares of the ancestor's lineal descendants.
In the case of the ancestor's reserve share, however, there is no special
disposable share in favor of the spouse. In a curious reversal of the situ-
ation when a spouse and one child survive (where it was seen that some
property can be left to anyone but the spouse), here all of the free portion
(one-half or three-quarters) can be given to the surviving spouse or any-
one else, and something in addition can be given to the spouse that cannot
be given to anyone else. By article 1094 the predeceasing spouse may
cut down the reserve share of the ancestor in each line from a quarter in
full ownership to a life interest in one-quarter when, and only when, he
disposes of the reversionary interest in favor of his wife. Although this
provision has been criticized as giving too little to the anscestor,94 it
should be borne in mind that the ancestor would take nothing at all when
children survive."'
The Commission has proposed, concerning the spouse's reserve share
when in competition with parents, that the spouse be given a reserve of
one-quarter, and the parents or the survivor of them be given a re-
serve of one-quarter-in effect, reducing by half the parents' present
rights as reserve heirs when both survive. 6 Under this modification the
predeceasing spouse could not, however, as under article 1094, cut down
the parents' reserve to a life interest in one-quarter. Consequently there
would be a freely disposable share of one-half in every case when the de-
ceased is survived by his spouse and one or both parents. In all other
cases-that is, those in which the deceased is survived by a spouse but
not by parents or descendants-the spouse's reserve share and the freely
disposable share would each be one-half. "  Ascendants other than par-
94. Bell-MacDonald, French Laws of Swcession, 2 INT'L &Coimn,. L.Q. 415,
425 (1953).
95. The present provision adopted in 1930 is, nevertheless, more generous than the
previous one of 1900 which permitted one spouse to give the survivor a life interest in
the ancestor's reserve share. This effectively destroyed the ancestor's reserve in most
cases, since the ancestor was usually older than the surviving spouse and predeceased
him.
Prior to 1957 when the surviving spouse's rights were enlarged by preferring him
to ordinary collaterals, the ancestor of the one line in which ancestors survived took
a life interest in one-third of the property which he did not take outright. In such a
case the ancestor took one-half and the collateral took one-half, their interests being
equally subject to the spouse's life interest in one-half. The ancestor's additional life
interest in one-sixth was borne by the collateral.




ents would be deprived of their status as reserve heirs and take in in-
testacy only in the absence of a surviving spouse and brothers and sisters
or their descendants. 8 In intestacy situations,9 brothers and sisters as a
group would share equally with the parents or parent, changing the pres-
ent provision which gives brothers and sisters three-quarters when only
one parent survives."0 Reflecting concern for the demotion on the suc-
cessional hierarchy of grandparents or more remote ascendants, proposed
article 568 gives such ascendants a right to subsistence from the surviving
spouse who accepts the succession, as well as from brothers and sisters
of the deceased who would presently be obligated to furnish subsistence
to an ancestor by article 205. Consistent with the status of the surviving
spouse as rdservataire, the proposed scheme eliminates the spouse's right
to a pension alimentaire from the succession of the predeceasing spouse.
It could occur that the spouse's reserve share was insufficient for his
support, the free share not being disposed of in his favor, thus putting
him in a less favorable position than under the present law. In most in-
stances, however, the spouse's position would be much improved under
the proposal to prefer him to the exclusion of grandparents in intestacy,
and to accord him, instead of them, a reserve share when no brothers and
sisters survive.
In all other cases where the predeceasing spouse is survived only by
collateral relatives, who have no reserve share, there is no restriction on
the amount that can be transferred to the surviving spouse by will or inter
vivos gift; the predeceasing spouse has complete freedom of disposition.
The Commission does not propose to change this.
D. The Second Spouse: Protection of Children of a Prior Marriage
The sophistication of the French system is well illustrated by the
present treatment of the second or subsequent spouse when there are liv-
ing children of a prior marriage. It has been noticed that all legitimate
children, regardless of whether born of the deceased spouse's first or
subsequent marriage, have equal rights as reserve heirs and share equally
in intestacy. The second or subsequent spouse who competes with
children of a prior marriage of his partner finds his rights severely
limited.
The thoroughness with which the rights of the surviving spouse are
limited when he is competing with children d'un autre lit is first suggested
by the provision of article 767 which puts a double restriction on the sur-
98. Id. art. 764.
99. Id. art. 762.
100. CoDE CIVIL art. 750.
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vivor's life interest ab intestat (ordinarily in one-quarter when chil-
dren of the marriage survive) : (1) his life interest is in a portion equal
to the share of the child of the deceased spouse taking the least in full
ownership, and (2) it can never exceed one-quarter.'' The first restric-
tion can operate only when the deceased leaves four or more children,
making each child's reserve share less than one-quarter, the total reserve
constituting three-quarters of the deceased's property. The second re-
striction, made necessary only because of the first, will operate only
when the deceased leaves not more than three children, and will accord
the spouse the usual life interest in one-quarter even though the smallest
child's share may exceed that amount. Not only is the survivor's life in-
terest in the succession restricted, but also the special disposable share is
limited by article 1098 to the amount that could be given to a stranger,
that is, one-half, one-third or one-quarter depending on whether one, two
or three or more children survive." 2  The second spouse is thus deprived
of the alternatives of article 1094, i.e., receiving a quarter outright and
life interest in three-quarters or a life interest in all of the deceased
spouse's property."3
The effect of the above restrictions is in most cases not nearly so
significant as the treatment of a gift to the second spouse of property
brought to the community in calculating the special disposable share.
When children of a prior marriage survive, articles 1496 and 1527 deny
to the spouse of the remarried person benefits by reason of a community
property regime, legal or conventional, beyond the limits of article 1098.
That is, the benefits of a community property regime are treated as gifts
and counted toward the subsequent spouse's free share, limited by article
1098 to the ordinary disposable share. Thus the usual freedom of the
spouses to make gifts in contemplation of marriage and to adopt any sort
of community property regime is here severely curtailed. When there are
no children of a prior marriage and when one party to the marriage re-
ceives more than he contributes, as is usually the case, such benefit is not
101. The child taking the least is the one who had not been favored at all or to
a lesser extent than any other, by means of the ordinary disposable share. Of course
such share may have been given to an outsider or to the surviving spouse or may have
passed by intestacy to the children equally.
102. Before 1963 the limit was a portion equal to the share of the child taking
the least and never to exceed one-quarter.
103. A new provision of article 1098 permits the child to limit the subsequent
spouse's (stepparent's) interest to the gift made under that article. By the child's so
availing himself, the surviving spouse is forced to give up his interest under article
767 (a life interest in not more than one-fourth of the succession) which he could
otherwise have combined with a gift under article 1098. The interest under article 767
would, of course, have been reduced to the extent of the value of the gift. CODE Crvm
arts. 767, 1098.
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treated as a gift between spouses subject to reduction if the limit of the
special disposable share has been exceeded, but rather is merely a benefit
received by acceptance of the particular marital property arrangement that
has been entered into. What would be unobjectionable were there not chil-
dren of a prior marriage may, in this case, be treated as an excessive gift
subject to recovery by the children of the first marriage in an action in
reduction upon the death of their remarried parent.' Benefits resulting
from the marital property system will be applied in the calculation of
what, if anything, remains of the free share under article 1098. To the
extent that the benefits of the community regime are less than such free
share, the children cannot complain.
The wisdom of the special treatment of the subsequent spouse is ap-
parent when it is remembered that in the usual case in which all children
and surviving spouse are of the same marriage, community property, any
property passing to the surviving spouse by antenuptial agreement, and
the special disposable share will be part of the succession of the survivor
and subject to the rights of the children as reserve heirs upon his death.
Hence the benefit received by one spouse upon adoption of the particular
marital property arrangement does not diminish the rights of children
which may be born of that marriage. The effect is simply that the chil-
dren take as reserve heirs of the other parent, i.e., the acquirer of prop-
erty rights under the marriage contract or the statutory community
regime. In the case of remarriage of a parent, children of the first
marriage will, of course, have no rights upon the death of the second
spouse of their remarried parent. Furthermore, the property in which
the second spouse is given an interest because of a community property
regime may have been acquired during the first marriage, thus enhancing
the claim of the children of that marriage.
It is fair and realistic to treat the subsequent spouse as a stranger
vis-i-vis the children of the prior marriage. In the absence of special
rules it would be possible for the reserve share of the children to be im-
paired whenever the marriage which produced them has been dissolved, a
parent remarries, and, for example, the statutory community is adopted
as to the second marriage. The Commission does not propose relaxation
of this protection, and the substance of articles 1496 and 1527 would
continue to apply in the calculation of the surviving spouse's reserve share.
The maximum amount which such a surviving spouse could claim in-
defeasibly under the Commission's proposal would be one-third, one child
104. Since the amount of the succession is not known until death, and consequently
it is not known whether the free share has been exceeded, the action in reduction can
be instituted only after the opening of the succession. CODE CIVIL art. 920.
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of a prior marriage of the deceased spouse surviving, the total reserve
portions thus being two-thirds of the succession.'
While property brought to the community by a remarried person is
treated as a gift (as is property acquired by gift which falls into the com-
munity during the second marriage in regard to children of a prior mar-
riage), savings from income, even of separate property, and gains account-
able to the efforts of the spouses are not subject to special rules."0 6 Such
property, even though it be the income of separate property of the re-
married spouse, is acquired during the second marriage and is sufficiently
associated with it so that it would be unfair to deprive the second spouse
of his usual community property rights.' The second spouse's right
to a peuzzion alimentaire is, of course, not affected by survival of children
of a first marriage.
While one might deplore the complications injected into an already
complex system by having special rules as to a subsequent spouse's rights
when there are children of a prior marriage, it must be remembered that
it is in this situation where tensions and discord most commonly occur."08
Thus the Commission has not proposed elimination of protection of the
children of the first marriage, except as such children's rights will be
altered by making the subsequent spouse a reserve heir.'0 9
III. THE FRENCH SYSTEM IN PERSPECTIVE
The promulgators of the Code Napoleon created a system of succes-
sions of great complexity; the law in this regard was conceived as pro-
moting the stability of society by preserving family solidarity and con-
serving family property. Today the system of the framers of the code
remains basically intact.
However, from the changes in the surviving spouse's situation since
1891 can be detected some modification of the concept of the promulga-
105. It is interesting to note that this is often the spouse's indefeasible share under
statutes of American separate property states.
106. CoDE Cvii art. 1527.
107. The concurrence of the two spouses' shares when there are children of the
first marriage presents a problem suggestive of the problem of concurrence of the
spouse's special share and the ordinary disposable share, but without the complexity of
the latter. In the American law a similar problem exists as to the coordination of dower
rights of first and subsequent wives when a marriage has terminated without fault of
the wife. If the first spouse has received the maximum permitted gift (one-quarter
plus life interest in the remaining three-quarters), the free share in favor of the spouse
has been completely exhausted, and nothing can be given or will pass ab intestat to the
subsequent spouse. To the extent that the special free share has not been used to the
benefit of the first spouse, it may be used in favor of the second, within the limitation of
article 1098, which limits the second spouse to the ordinary disposable share. 4 RIPERT &
BOULANGER, TIaxTA DE DROIT CIVIL § 1919 (1959).
108. M AcDoNALD, FAuD ON THE WxnoW's SHARE (1960).
109. CoMMIssIoN 31.
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tors of the code in 1804 that family property should be transmitted
through blood lines. The spouse has now assumed an important r6le in
the successional scheme as one to whom significant amounts of the de-
ceased spouse's property will pass by operation of the law in situations
which occur with considerable frequency. The interest which may be
disposed of in favor of the spouse when children survive has recently
been increased to the extent of a life interest in an additional half of the
predeceasing spouse's property. Still, while the share accorded the sur-
viving spouse in the succession has been gradually increased in many
situations, no new indefeasible rights have been accorded him; his modest
life interest in one-quarter of the succession when children survive has
not been increased since it inception in 1891. The principal channel of
property transmission continues to be from parent to child under a system
of forced heirship and not from predeceasing spouse to surviving spouse.
For a fair appraisal of the surviving spouse's position it must be recog-
nized that he is a reserve heir of his parents and children, thereby acquir-
ing indefeasible rights in his family's property, if any. Thus when mar-
riages occur among persons of the same economic class, the present
French system may not hold the surviving spouse in such disfavor as
would first appear. Writers have, however, criticized the failure to make
the spouse a reserve heir"' as under German, 1 ' Swiss"2 and Italian113
codes.
The reserve share of the parent makes a reasonable allocation which
does not unduly limit the interests which may be given to the spouse. The
proposals of the Commission provide a reserve share for parents and for
the spouse in those situations in which parents alone would have a reserve
share under the present law. Parents would continue to have no rights
to a reserve when in competition with children of the deceased. In terms
of need, the parent, because of the greater probability of advanced age
and incapacity to earn a living, may have a better claim than the spouse
or child. However, neither in French nor American law is such a ra-
tionale apparently fully accepted, for under neither system do parents
share in intestacy when in competition with the children of the deceased.
Perhaps the child's need is greater than the parent's; nevertheless, neither
in France nor the United States is there favored treatment for the minor
or otherwise dependent child.:"4  The law in this regard may represent a
110. 4 RPnz r & BOULANGER, op. cit. supra note 107, § 1711.
111. BtiRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH § 2303 (Ger. 21st ed. Palandt 1962).
112. CODE CViL art. 470 (Swiss 1907).
113. CoDicE CIviLE art. 540 (Italy 1942).
114. Consider, however, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 733.20 (1963), providing that when a
parent has died testate and survived by a child under eighteen not provided for in the
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compromise of competing interests without any well-articulated rationale.
Or it may be that the preference for property to descend rather than
ascend is a reflection of the parent's desire to help his child succeed to his
position, thus perpetuating the position of his family.
The Commission's primary object is the improvement of the position
of the surviving spouse by making him not only an heir but a reserve
heir who shares equally with children and who is preferred to all col-
laterals. Simplification of a system which requires even experienced
lawyers in France constantly to refer to the code in answering routine
questions would be an important by-product. Decades before the Com-
mission began its deliberations, the system developed under the German
law, while leaning on the French system already a century old, demon-
strated that the benefits from a system which recognizes the claim of a
surviving spouse to share in the deceased's property can be enjoyed under
a system less complex than the French.
The Commission recognizes the tendency of the modern family unit
to include the spouse but not to include adult brothers and sisters or
grandparents within the family unit. Its proposals display an awareness
that the position of the spouse in the family has changed since the time
the code was promulgated and move toward even closer integration of
the rights of the immediate family. Social mobility and geographical
mobility are factors to which we may attribute some of the change in
popular attitudes toward the family. Today in both France and the
United States popular attitudes would subordinate the claims of collateral
relatives in the deceased's property to those of the spouse. By the Com-
mission's proposals each spouse is in effect received into the family of
the other and treated as an appropriate member, indeed the only member
as to his reserve portion, to take a substantial part of that family's prop-
erty. Contrary to the traditional concept, property would not always
move through blood lines, but some or all would pass to the spouse by
intestacy and some would be forced to the surviving spouse even when he
is in competition with the descendants, ancestors or brothers and sisters
of the deceased.
It is desirable for the law to be harmonious with popular attitudes,
expectations and patterns of conduct unless there is some overriding
will, the court may make provision for such child until its eighteenth birthday, but not
to exceed the share such child would have taken in intestacy. In the words of the
statute, "This provision is designed to afford reasonable protection to a dependent
minor child who has been excluded from the provisions of the parents' [sic] will under
circumstances which deprive it of an effective legal substitute for the continuing obliga-
tion of the parent, while living, for support and maintenance during the period of its
minority."
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policy to be served by having it otherwise. That the law in France no
longer reflects the community's judgment is indicated by the popular
sentiments concerning the rights to the undisposed paintings and draw-
ings of the late Pierre Bonnard, the renowned artist."' In 1930 he mar-
ried Marthe de Melliny, nde Marie Boursin, without entering into a con-
tract fixing property rights; the statutory community regime therefore
ensued. There were no children. At the time of Marthe's death in 1942
there were in the studio hundreds of paintings and drawings, finished
and unfinished and worth a fortune. When Bonnard discovered that
Marthe's heirs, four nieces, could claim all of her half of the community
property, he forged an instrument which purported to be signed by her
and which left all her property to him. The forgery did not finally suc-
ceed since he did not bother to imitate her handwriting and dated it after
her death. By his will he left all the works of art to his nephew, who
was to establish a museum. If the art works were treated as community
property, Pierre Bonnard would not share in Marthe's half of the com-
munity property, except to the extent of a life interest in one-half under
article 767, since community property is subject to the usual rules govern-
ing successions. Bonnard would take nothing in full ownership when his
wife was survived by descendants of brothers and sisters or, for that
matter, until 1957, when his wife was survived by ordinary collaterals
within the sixth degree in both lines. Litigation continued for more than
a decade after Bonnard's death between the nephew, legatee under Bon-
nard's will, and the heirs of the wife, her nieces. The legatee of Pierre
Bonnard finally prevailed because it was held that a spouse under a com-
munity property regime acquires no rights in works of art created by the
other before their sale or publication, a premise that could have the un-
desirable effect of reducing a surviving spouse's rights in many situa-
tions, e.g., if Pierre Bonnard had been the first to die. It was evident
that popular opinion was an influence upon the court in the final disposi-
tion of the matter. Although feelings were probably intensified because
of the nature of the property, the celebrated case indicates the disparity
between the existing law and popular attitudes. It points up the need to
enact the Commission's proposals, which prefer the spouse to the exclu-
sion of all collateral relatives in intestacy.
Finally, it must be emphasized that the Commission's proposals do
not seriously disrupt the basic system of forced heirship-the reserve
shares of children. Since there seems to be no widespread feeling that
the reserve should give way to freedom of disposition within wider limits,
115. Time, March 9, 1959, p. 21; Newsweek, Jan. 7, 1957, p. 48.
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one would not expect the Commission to propose a change in this regard,
nor do the legislative changes of 1963 move significantly in this direc-
tion. Despite the fact that attitudes toward the family have undergone
changes since the era of the promulgation of the code, the bonds of the
family remain very strong in France. Under the proposals the maximum
reduction of a child's reserve share, occasioned by the spouse's being made
a reserve heir, would occur when the spouse and one child survive, the
child's reserve in such case being cut from one-half to one-third." 6  The
child, however, would recover at least half of the reduction by virtue of
his reserve share upon the death of the surviving parent.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
What is to be gained for the American lawyer and legislator by the
examination of the French system? Most conclusions can be stated only
tentatively, at least until there has been more extensive investigation of
the practical operation of the French system, including such matters as
the success of evasive devices, if any, that are resorted to in order to de-
feat the forced share. It is clear that we do not want the needless com-
plexities and plethora of detail of the existing French system. For this
reason we may wish to look particularly at the proposals of the Commis-
sion, which can perhaps be taken as a distillate of the French experience.
From an examination of them, it may be inferred, first of all, that rea-
sonable protection from disinheritance of spouse and reasonable protec-
tion of children are not mutually exclusive; it is possible to protect both
simultaneously. It is also possible to add the refinement of preferring
the spouse to the child in the case of small estates by giving him everything
up to a certain amount, as is currently done in cases of intestacy in Eng-
land.'17 But to say that we can protect both child and spouse is not to
face the basic question, heavy with implication for the social and economic
structure, of whether we want to protect children as well as spouses from
disinheritance. Whether the reserve system promotes family solidarity
as its advocates claim can be judged, if at all, only by those familiar with
the practical operation of the system and the socital background in which
it functions. It can be as plausibly urged that the reserve system is a
product rather than a cause of family solidarity; it could be both. We
can, however, focus upon much narrower considerations: whether it is
wiser for an undeserving or well-to-do child occasionally to share in his
parent's property so that the "bad" parent cannot disinherit the deserving
116. ComiissioN arts. 769, 885.
117. The Administration of Estates Act, 1925, 15 Geo. 5, c. 23, as amended, Int-
estate's Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 64.
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child. The detriment of protecting the unworthy child, it is submitted,
is more than offset by protection from capricious, malicious or otherwise
wrongful disinheritance afforded the worthy child. The law should be
less concerned with occasional undeserved rewards than an occasional
withholding from a deserving child that which custom, reflecting basic
human impulses, usually accords. The price of this protection is to limit
freedom of disposition, but the price is not complete rigidity since, as has
been shown, the reserve system does not necessarily mean one of equality.
The property owner under the existing and proposed French systems can
still control the disposition of at least a quarter of his property by gift
or will.
Some other defects in the American law could be remedied by bor-
rowing from the French law without necessarily making the momentous
policy decision involved in whether children should be forced heirs. The
French system indicates a cure for the present lack of integration of inter
vivos and testamentary gifts in determining the surviving spouse's rights
to an indefeasible share. Presumably the policy decision to protect the
surviving spouse was made long ago, and such integration would but give
him the protection legislators intended to confer. On the other hand, per-
haps legislators would favor as a sort of compromise the present vague-
ness of the law in regard to inter vivos transactions which will defeat the
spouse's statutory share. Vagueness gives latitude to the judge in giving
weight to those factual elements in the particular case which will lead to a
result consonant with the community's notions of fairness. It is sub-
mitted, however, that vagueness cannot be justified on those grounds;
uncertainty produces litigation and imposes a hardship on conscientious
persons, both donors and donees, because they cannot be certain that un-
objectionable and good faith arrangements will be upheld. If integra-
tion of lifetime gifts should be adopted, appropriate formalities would
have to be developed, indicating need for inquiry into practical operations
of gift transactions under the French system.
The reserve system seems an appealing solution in the situation in
which a remarried person disposing of his property prefers his subsequent
spouse, the stepparent, to the children of his first marriage. In this fer-
tile source of family disharmony and litigation under American law, we
may profit from an adaptation of the French system. As in the case of
integration of inter vivos gifts in determining the surviving spouse's in-
defeasible share, restrictions could be put on property transmitted to a
subsequent spouse without necessarily adopting a system of forced heir-
ship as to children. What is needed in this situation are special rules
which, while recognizing the legitimate claims of both the spouse and the
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children, recognize also that the interests of the subsequent spouse and
children of a prior marriage are probably antagonistic. Statutes of a
handful of states provide for devolution of property acquired from pre-
deceasing spouse to his heirs upon the death of the surviving spouse;..8
such statutes do not purport to prevent the surviving spouse from dis-
posing of such property by will or gift in favor of a subsequent spouse.
More generally, nothing prevents the predeceasing remarried spouse from
cutting out the children to the profit of the subsequent spouse, nor from
transferring everything inter vivos to the children to the detriment of the
subsequent spouse, the stepparent. The French treatment of the subse-
quent spouse shows that it is possible to put a special restriction on gifts
and legacies to the subsequent spouse when there are children of a prior
marriage. Even without altering the power of the parent to disinherit
his children, unfairness to children in this situation could be substantially
alleviated. Here again, investigation of formalities in the French system
would be necessary. When children of both marriages survive, there
exists a special argument for establishment of a system of reserve shares
to insure that neither group is favored unduly. On the other hand, it
might be urged that this is a case where discretion is needed since the
younger group of children may have greater need. Perhaps the answer
is to accord dependent children a right to support from the estate which
would operate independently of their reserve shares.
The more the American lawyer and legislator are aware of and con-
versant with the solutions of foreign legal systems, the better they are
equipped for an era when our law is, as a matter of reason, logic and
necessity, becoming increasingly attentive to foreign solutions. It is to be
hoped that when American legislatures consider changes in the law of
succession, they will look to the French experience and consider it as an
invaluable source for shaping revisions.
118. CAL. PROD. CODE §§ 228-29; OHIo REV. CODE AN. tit. 21, § 2105.06 (Ander-
son 1953); OKLa. STAT. tit. 84, § 213(2) (1961); Annot., 49 A.L.R.2d 391 (1956).
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